We consider whether a career-minded expert would make better decisions if the principal could observe the consequences of the expert's action. The previous literature has found that this "transparency of consequence" can only improve the efficacy of the expert's decision making.
Introduction
In many situations individuals delegate authority to an informed expert: investors give money to a fund manager in the hopes that it will be be invested wisely; voters elect politicians to make decisions for them; judges are charged with interpreting the law and upholding the constitution on behalf of the people. Of course, in situations where the principal delegates to an expert, there is always the concern that the expert will not act in the principal's interest. In particular, we consider a situation where the expert's objective is to promote his own career rather than to promote the principal's welfare. In such a situation there is the concern that the expert might ignore or distort socially valuable information in order to safeguard his reputation. It is usually argued that these concerns are lessened, however, if the principal can observe the outcome of the chosen policy:
learning the outcome of the chosen policy creates an incentive for the expert to choose the policy most likely to give the principal a high payoff.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the principal benefits from observing the consequences of the policy the expert selects; the principal may well prefer the expert to select a policy which is less likely to succeed given that some mistakes are more costly than others. There are many situations where the ex-ante less likely outcome is associated with a greater potential cost: stock market crashes are relatively rare events but can lead to large losses or even bankruptcy; the defendant in a trial is more likely to be guilty but the costs of convicting the innocent are greater than the costs of acquitting the guilty; a Senator who believed that Iraq more likely than not had weapons of mass destruction could still believe the war was misguided if the costs of invading without finding weapons were greater than the costs of not invading if Iraq had weapons. In such a setting, it might be socially optimal for an expert to go against the prior even if, conditional on his private information, that alternative is more likely to match the state of the world. In such a setting we show that observing the outcome of the chosen policy will increase the incentive to herd in a socially harmful manner.
Consider a setting where an expert may be high-ability, in which case he observes a perfectly accurate signal of the state, or low-ability, in which case he observes a noisy but informative signal of the state. Now consider the decision of a low-type expert who observes a signal that goes against the prior. If only the high-type expert were to ever go against the prior, and the state of the world is not learned, the low-type expert can mimic the behavior of the high-type expert by choosing the ex-ante less-likely alternative. So, in equilibrium, some low-type experts will follow their signal. Now, suppose the state of the world will be learned with certainty prior to assigning the expert's reputation. The low-type expert can no longer mimic the high-type expert by going against the prior -if the state matches the prior the expert will reveal himself to be low-ability. So, if the prior is high enough, the expert will ignore his information and stick with the action which corresponds to the prior -even if it would be socially beneficial for the expert to follow his signal.
One extremely natural interpretation of our model is of a fund-manager. First, the manager's reputation for competence is supremely important so it makes sense to model the manager's objective as maximizing his reputation for competence. Second, a market crash is a relatively rare event but caries with it extremely large costs for investors. Third, there is extremely fast feedback about the outcomes resulting from the manager's decisions. Finally, there is much concern in the financial literature about herd behavior (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein 1990). Our results then raise the possibility that there is so much herding precisely because there is so much information available about the quality of the manager's choice: a manager who observes a signal that a crash is possible but not likely would be reluctant to act on such information for fear of being proven wrong. So, the career concerns of the manager lead him to expose the investors to excessive risk of a catastrophic loss -a distortion which is heightened when the manager's performance is more easily evaluated.
Another situation where our model might apply is to a legislator who must decide whether to approve an executive's proposal. Consider, for example, a U.S. Senator asked to vote on whether to authorize the Bush administration to use force against Iraq. Suppose the Senator (or more accurately the constituents the Senator represents) feel that war is justified if weapons of mass destruction exist but not justified if they don't. In the lead-up to the war the prior that weapons of mass destruction existed was high but so were the costs of invading a country without weapons.
If the Senator had weak information that weapons of mass destruction did not exist, our results indicate that such a Senator would be more likely to oppose the war if it would not be learned whether the weapons existed. 1
As the above examples indicate, we show that, in environments with a sufficiently unbalanced prior, learning the consequences of an expert's action will only increase the incentive for experts to herd on the prior. As such, efforts to improve transparency, and thereby increase the speed with which the outcome of the chosen policy is revealed, though frequently beneficial, can, in some cases, re-enforce the distortions. Consequently, increasing the frequency of disclosure for financial institutions may have the counter-productive effect of increasing the manager's incentive to herd.
Similarly, increasing the effectiveness of the media, which makes it more likely that the consequences of a politician's actions will be learned before the next election, can make politicians less likely to act pre-emptively to avert a disaster. 2
In most of the agency literature, the more information the principal has, the better the agent's behavior will be. However, the literature provides some examples where the principal may prefer less information. 3 Of particular relevance for our work, Prat (2005) the principal is made better off observing the action the expert selects ("transparency of action") but worse off observing the consequences of that action ("transparency of consequence"). That is, while transparency of consequence is potentially harmful, transparency of action is beneficial.
Whether "transparency of consequence" or "transparency of action" is beneficial will depend on the cost structure. In equilibrium, the behavior of a career-minded expert will not be affected by the distribution of costs; in contrast, the first-best decision rule will depend on the costs associated with different outcomes. As such, statements about the welfare implications of different transparency regimes will be sensitive to the specification of costs.
We show that, when the prior on the state of the world is sufficiently unbalanced, and the expert has private information about his own competence, it will be possible, in general, to order the likelihood of the low-type expert following his signal across the three different transparency regimes: the expert is most likely to herd on the prior when only the consequence is observed, and least likely to when only the action is observed. Interestingly, this means that, except when the expert's decision corresponds to the first-best outcome under full transparency, some type of non-transparency will always result in an increase in the principal's welfare; which type of non-tranparency will depend on the costs of different kinds of mistakes. We show that, if the high-type expert's signal is not perfectly accurate, the expert's decision under full transparency will generically not result in the first best outcome, so some form of non-transparency will almost always be beneficial.
Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes. The proofs of our results are left to the Appendix.
3 See Prat (2005) for a discussion. For example, the agent might not work as hard if more is known about his type (Holmstrom 1999) or if his action is more accurately observed (Dewatripont et al. 1999 ).
Model
A privately informed expert must make a decision on behalf of a principal. 5 We assume that there are two states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}, with the prior probability that the state is 1,
There are two possible policies which could be selected, p ∈ {0, 1}. The utility to the principal depends on whether the policy matches the state
(1)
Normalizing the payoff when the policy matches the state to be 0 in either state will be without loss of generality, as what matters is the difference between the payoff when the policy matches the state and when it does not. Notice that we are not assuming that the two types of errors are equally costly: if κ is large then selecting policy 1 in state 0 is more costly than selecting policy 0 in state 1. In what follows we will focus on the case where κ ≥ 1, so the ex-ante less-likely outcome is also the one with the greater potential cost. 6
The expert observes a private signal, s ∈ {0, 1}, of the state of the world. Experts are heterogenous with regard to their ability: the expert can be either high ability or low ability, t ∈ {l, h}.
We assume the expert is the high type with probability α ∈ (0, 1). The expert knows his own type but the principal knows only the distribution of expert types. A high-type expert observes a signal that is accurate with probability q h , whereas a low-type expert observes a signal that is accurate with probability q l . That is, P r(s = 1|ω = 1, t = h) = P r(s = 0|ω = 0, t = h) = q h and P r(s = 1|ω = 1, t = l) = P r(s = 0|ω = 0, t = l) = q l . We assume 1 2 < q l < q h ≤ 1. The expert is the only active player in our model. His strategy maps his type and his signal of the state into a probability of selecting each action. Formally, the expert's strategy is represented by σ(t, s) ∈ [0, 1], the probability with which the expert selects action 0 for each type t ∈ {l, h} and signal of the state, s ∈ {0, 1}. The principal takes no action but updates her belief about the expert's type based on the information she observes. Finally, we assume that the expert's concern is to appear competent, so he seeks to maximize the probability that the principal places on him being the high type. The key assumption underlying this payoff structure is that long term contracting between 5 We use male pronouns for the expert and female pronouns for the principal.
6 See Fox and Van Weelden (2010) for a model of executive-legislative interaction and oversight which uses this cost structure. the principal and the expert is not possible. 7 We compare the efficiency -defined as the principal's expected utility in the current period -of different information structures. 8 Following Prat (2005), we describe learning the outcome of the chosen policy before assigning reputation as "transparency on consequence" and observing the action taken by the expert as "transparency on action". As Prat (2005) considers the effect of transparency over actions, our analysis will focus more heavily on the role of transparency over consequences.
Under the first information structure, the principal observes both the action taken by the expert and the outcome of the selected policy. We refer to this as Full Transparency (FT). If the state of the world is learned before reputations are assigned the expert's reputation is given by
Under the information structure in which the principal does not observe the outcome of the chosen policy (equivalently does not observe the state of the world) we define
We refer to this as the Non-Transparent Consequences (NC) information structure. Notice that with both Full Transparency and Non-Transparent Consequences the probability of learning the state is independent of the chosen policy. Our results then will not be driven by a correlation between the action taken and the probability of learning the state, something which has been explored in the previous literature (e.g. Canes-Wrones et al. 2001 , Levy 2005 .
Finally, we consider the case where the principal does not observe the chosen policy but does observe whether or not the chosen policy matches the state. We can then define the updated reputation of the expert whether or not the policy matches the state,
We refer to this as Non-Transparent Action (NA). 9
7 Clearly, if the principal were able write contracts with the expert which conditioned his payoff on the observed action or consequences, greater transparency can never be harmful to the principal.
8 This means that we are ignoring the possible benefits to the principal from learning about the expert's type. One setting in which the principal would derive no benefit from learning about the expert's type is a perfectly competitive market without the possibility of long term contracting. As all experts would then be paid according to their expected value, all the gains/losses from learning about the expert's competence would accrue to the expert. These assumptions are standard in the career concerns literature pioneered by Holmstrom (1982 Holmstrom ( , 1999 . 9 As costs are asymmetric, we assume that the principal observes whether the policy matches the state but not her utility; consequently, the principal cannot infer the action chosen from the utility she receives. If the principal were to observe her utility, when costs are not symmetric, the principal must be able to infer the action taken either when the policy matches the state or when the policy and the state do not match. Further, when the principal would be able to back out the state would depend on the utility levels assigned for different actions. In our setup the assumption that u(ω, ω) = 0 in both states is without loss of generality. Note also that the information possessed by the principal, and the principal's updating, is exactly the same in our model as in Prat (2003 Prat ( , 2005 .
Under all three information structures, in equilibrium, the principal assigns her beliefs based on Bayesian updating and the expert chooses his strategy to maximize his expected reputation.
Before proceeding to the results, we discuss what behavior would maximize the principal's welfare.
In order to make the problem interesting, we restrict attention to parameters where delegating to an expert is potentially beneficial to the principal. We first assume that
which means that, if the principal did not have access to an expert, she would go with her prior and select policy 1. Similarly, the principal's welfare is higher if any expert, regardless of his type, who observes signal s = 1 chooses policy p = 1 rather than p = 0. While this assumption will not be necessary for any of our results which follow it does guarantee that the principal's welfare under the informative equilibrium we consider will be higher than in an equilibrium in which the expert always chooses policy p = 0. Second, we assume that
which ensures that the principal would like the high-type expert to follow his signal even if it goes against the prior.
As π ≥ 1 2 , the probability that the state is 1, after a low-type expert observes a signal 0, may still be greater than 1 2 . However, if κ is reasonably large, this does not mean that it is socially optimal for such an expert to ignore his signal. We can calculate
.
Note that the probability that the state is 1, conditional on a low-type expert observing a signal of 0, is greater than 1 2 when π > q l . Further, the expected utility of the principal if p = 1 is chosen is −κP r(ω = 0|t = l, s = 0), whereas the expected utility from selecting p = 0 is −P r(ω = 1|t = l, s = 0). Re-arranging the above expression we have that, when κ is sufficiently high, the principal would benefit if a low-type expert selects policy p = 0 after observing signal
then it is socially optimal for low-type experts to select p = 0 after observing s = 0; if κ < π(1−q l ) q l (1−π) then it is socially optimal for low-type experts to select p = 1 after observing s = 0.
Notice that, when κ > 1, it is possible for the principal to prefer the low-type expert to take action p = 0, even when π > q l . As the main contribution of this paper -showing that transparency over consequences can be socially harmful -will require that π > q l , in our analysis we will assume π ∈ (q l , q h ). 10 Under this range of priors, with reasonable restrictions on the expert's behavior, the equilibrium will be unique.
Results

Preliminaries
We now turn to the analysis of equilibrium behavior. As the expert's payoff does not depend on the policy selected there will be many equilibria of this game. As is standard in the literature, 11
we restrict attention to informative equilibria and ignore "mirror" or "perverse" equilibria in which the high-type expert chooses the policy opposite to his signal. We will say that an equilibrium is non-pooling if both policies, p = 1 and p = 0, are selected by the expert with positive probability along the equilibrium path. Further, to rule out babbling and perverse equilibria, we focus on equilibria in which the expert plays a monotone strategy.
Definition 1 The expert's strategy, σ, is monotone if, for any type and signal combination (t, s) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , if σ(t, s) < 1, then for all (t , s ) such that
we have σ(t , s ) = 1.
We will refer to an equilibrium as monotone if the expert is playing a monotone strategy. Monotone equilibria are then those in which the experts who have the strongest information that the state is 1 (respectively 0) are the ones most likely to propose policy p = 1 (p = 0). In particular, it assumes that if an expert chooses a specific policy, any expert who places a higher probability on that policy matching the state of the world must always choose that policy.
Our first result is that there will always exist a unique non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for any parameters under any of the three information systems we consider.
10 The case where π < q l has been more heavily studied in the literature (e.g. Canes-Wrone et al. 2001) . In that case, the low-type expert's signal is more accurate than the prior, and learning the state of the world will increase the expert's incentive to follow his signal, even if it goes against the prior. It would still be possible for learning the state of the world to be socially harmful when π < q l , but only when κ < 1.
11 For example, see Prat (2005) and Levy (2004 Levy ( , 2007 .
Proposition 1 Suppose q l < π < q h . Under all three information structures, j ∈ {F T, N A, N C}, there exists a non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This equilibrium involves the high-type expert following his signal and the low-type expert selecting policy p = 1 if he observes s = 1 and policy p = 0 with probability σ j 0 ∈ [0, 1] if he observes s = 0. Further, this equilibrium is unique, up to the beliefs at off-path information sets.
As the high-type expert will always follow his signal we can then characterize the expert's strategy in the non-pooling, monotone, equilibrium in each environment by the number σ j 0 , the probability with which a low-type expert selects policy p = 0 after observing signal s = 0 under information structure j ∈ {F T, N A, N C}. We now proceed to compare the equilibria across the different information structures.
Results (q h = 1)
We first consider the case where the high-type's signal is perfectly accurate. That is, we assume that q h = 1 and q l = q. This simplifies the algebra as the principal would know with certainty that any "mistake" must have been made by the low-type expert. The main result of this section is that the low-type expert is most willing to act on his private information when information about the consequences of his action is suppressed. We further show that the low-type expert is least likely to act on his private information when the principal cannot observe the action taken.
We first discuss the relationship between (N C) and (F T ) when π ≥ π * . Consider first the case where the principal doesn't observe the consequences of the policy the expert selects (N C). If only the high-type expert were to ever select p = 0 then selecting 0 would reveal the expert to be high-ability with certainty. Hence, in equilibrium, the low-type expert must choose policy p = 0 with positive probability after observing s = 0. Now consider the effect of revealing the consequences of the expert's decision (F T ). If the consequences of the selected policy are not observed, the low-type expert who observes s = 0 can mimic the high-type expert who observes signal s = 0; if the principal observes the consequences of the chosen policy, however, this is not possible. If the low-type expert received an incorrect signal this will be revealed. Hence, if, conditional on the low-type expert's signal, the probability that the state is 1 is sufficiently high, the expert would prefer to select policy p = 1 rather than increase the probability of revealing himself to have observed an incorrect signal by choosing policy p = 0.
As a high-type expert never observes an incorrect signal, the expert's expected reputation, from either policy choice, is equal to his reputation if proven correct multiplied by the probability that his choice will match the state. Now, as the principal would infer that the expert is the high-type with certainty if he is proven correct after choosing policy 0 but not after choosing policy 1, in order to support an equilibrium where all low-type experts choose policy p = 1, the low-type expert must believe that the state of the world is sufficiently more likely to be ω = 1 than ω = 0 after observing signal s = 0. That is, we will have that the low-type expert will always choose policy p = 1 if
which is a stronger condition than π > q. Notice also that the smaller α is, the higher π must be for the low-type to always choose policy p = 1. This is because selecting p = 0 also reveals that the expert is more likely to be the high type, so, conditional on being correct, the expert's reputation is enhanced even more. As α gets larger, this "selection effect" becomes less important, and the condition approaches simply π > q.
Whether or not the principal benefits from hiding the consequences of the expert's decision depends on the costs: if κ is large, the principal would prefer low-type experts to select p = 0 when they observe s = 0, so the welfare of the principal is higher if she does not observe the consequences of the selected policy. Combining part (1) of the above proposition with Remark 1 we get the following corollary.
then the utility of the principal is higher with Non-Transparent Consequences than under Full Transparency.
Notice that the above condition provides a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for "transparency over consequences" to be harmful. We have then established that, when κ and π are sufficiently large, the principal's welfare is higher if she does not observe the outcome from the selected policy. Note that in order for this corollary to apply we must have, κ ≥ 1 α > 1, which is most easily satisfied when α is large -that is, when there are many high-type experts in the population. Finally note that, in order for the principal to be harmed by learning the outcome of the policy, two things must be true: first, the prior on the state being 1 must be sufficiently high that a low-type expert believes that state is more likely even if he observes a signal of 0; second, the cost to the ex-ante less likely outcome must be high enough that it is in the principal's interest for the low-type expert to follow his signal anyways.
Finally, note that while the low-type expert must choose policy p = 0 with positive probability under Full Transparency when π < π * , a simple continuity argument establishes that, for a non-degenerate interval (π * , π * ) he will do so with greater probability under Non-Transparent Consequences.
Having explored the implications of suppressing information about the consequences of the expert's action, we now examine what happens when the expert's action is not revealed, but the consequences are (N A). This is the "lack of transparency" considered in Prat (2005) . In particular, Prat (2005) shows that the expert's chosen policy is more likely to match the state of the world if the principal only observes the outcome of the policy, as opposed to the specific policy the expert selects. 12 In our setting, this means that the low-type expert will choose policy p = 1 regardless of his signal for a wider range of priors on the state (part (2) of Proposition 2). As the expert's choice of policy cannot signal anything about his competence (since the principal doesn't observe it), the expert will then choose the policy most likely to match the state of the world; when π > q this means that the low-type will select p = 1 regardless of his signal. Hence there is a wider range of parameters under which the low-type expert will always choose policy p = 1 regardless of his signal when the action the expert takes is hidden.
We now consider whether this lack of transparency over actions is beneficial in our setting. In fact, we see that the result goes in the opposite direction of Prat's when κ is large: transparency of action is beneficial, but transparency of consequence is not. Prat's positive results about transparency over actions still hold in our setting -lack of transparency of action makes it more likely the expert's policy choice matches the state -but, with asymmetric costs, this can be associated with a decrease in the principal's expected welfare. When costs are symmetric (κ ≈ 1) non-tranparency of action can only be beneficial.
We now present the general results when the expert's signal is not perfectly accurate. We will show that, when the prior is sufficiently unbalanced, full transparency is (generically) not the optimal information structure. When the costs are sufficiently asymmetric, the principal would prefer not to observe the consequences of the expert's action; when the costs are symmetric, the principal would prefer to observe the consequences of the action but not the action itself.
Results (q h < 1)
We now consider the equilibrium behavior when the high type's signal is not perfectly accurate.
While assuming that the high type's signal is perfectly accurate simplifies the algebra it also means that the principal will believe that the expert is the low type with certainty if she ever learns that 12 In Prat (2005), the expert has no private information about his own ability, though his results continue to hold in the case where the expert does. This is shown in the unpublished working paper version, Prat (2003) which corresponds to the case we consider. the expert's signal did not match the state. Hence, for a wide range of parameters, if the principal observes the consequences of the expert's action, the low-type expert will always stick with the prior out of fear of being proven wrong. In contrast, if the high-type expert's signal is not perfect, the expert who received an incorrect signal may still be the high type; consequently, if only high-type experts were to take a certain action, then the principal would infer that they were the high-type regardless of the consequences of the action. So, when the action is observed, the low-type expert must also be willing to go against the prior with some probability in equilibrium. Under NonTransparent Action the principal cannot distinguish which type of mistake was made, so the expert will choose the policy most likely to match the state. Our next result shows that, if the high-type expert's signal is sufficiently accurate, but not perfectly accurate, then we can rank the probability that the low-type expert will go against the prior under each of the three information structures.
Proposition 3 For all π > π * , there exists aq h (q l , π) < 1 such that, for all q h ∈ (q h (q l , π), 1),
So we see that the low-type expert is most likely to act on his signal of the state when the consequences of his action are unobserved, and least likely when only the consequences are observed.
, then the principal will not be indifferent over the low-type expert's decision after observing s = 0. As such an expert randomizes with a non-degenerate probability under the Full Transparency information structure, some form of non-transparency will lead to a strict increase in the principal's welfare. Whether Non-Transparent Consequences or Non-Transparent Action is preferred will depend on the cost κ.
Corollary 2 Suppose π > π * and q h ∈ (q h (q l , π), 1). Then,
, then the principal's welfare is highest with Non-Transparent Consequences.
if κ <
π(1−q l ) q l (1−π) , then the principal's welfare is highest with Non-Transparent Action.
Full Transparency is only welfare maximizing if
, in which case all three information structures generate the same payoff to the principal.
So we see that, generically, when the prior is sufficiently unbalanced and the high-type expert's signal is sufficiently accurate, there is some form of non-transparency which strictly increases the principal's welfare. Which type of non-transparency is beneficial will depend on the cost structure.
Further, when one form of non-transparency is beneficial the other form will be harmful. Thus, Full Transparency will always be the second most preferred information structure for any parameters.
Hence, if some of the relevant parameters (π, q l , κ) are unknown, Full Transparency may well be the most preferred information structure ex-ante. Further, it should be noted that if the principal benefits from learning about the expert's type -which she does not in this model -this could provide additional benefits to the Full Transparency information structure. Finally, as previously noted, if the principal could contract with the expert based on her observations, then greater transparency can only benefit the principal.
Discussion
Before concluding, we pause to discuss the implications of our results. While the main focus of our analysis has been on the welfare implications of the different information regimes, we have also provided positive predictions about the behavior of career-minded experts. While the previous literature has identified environments in which improved information about the consequences of an expert's decision will mitigate the distortions induced by career concerns (e.g. Canes-Wrone et al.
2001, Prat 2005, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006), we have shown that when the prior is sufficiently
unbalanced, experts will be more willing to go against the prior when the consequences of their actions are less transparent. Consequently, in many circumstances, we should expect individuals to be more willing to challenge the conventional wisdom when it will be more difficult to evaluate the consequences of their choices. That is, the incentive to herd can be heightened with increased transparency as experts are afraid to be proven wrong. 13 
Conclusions
We considered a setting in which the costs of one type of mistake are greater than the other. We showed that a career-minded expert will not adjust his behavior appropriately to deal with such costs, and showed that learning the consequences of the policy the expert selects may only increase the distortions. While learning the state increases the incentives for the expert to select the policy more likely to be "correct," this may not be the policy which maximizes ex-ante welfare. So we have that, when the cost structure is sufficiently asymmetric, observing the outcome of the policy the expert selects makes the principal worse off. In the career concerns literature, the expert's objective, and hence equilibrium behavior, does not depend on the distribution of costs. The first-best decision rule, in contrast, will be closely tied to the cost structure. As such, statements about welfare will always be very sensitive to specified cost structure in the model.
We have shown that hiding the consequences of the action increases the incentives to choose the action less likely to match the state, whereas, hiding the action taken will decrease this incentive.
As the outcome with full transparency will generically fall short of the first best, some form on non-traparency will always be beneficial; which type of non-transparency is desired, however, will depend on the specific cost structure. 
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Appendix
In this section we provide the proofs of Propositions 1-3. We begin with the proof of Proposition 1, the existence and uniqueness of a non-pooling, monotone equilibrium. As this result encapsulates statements about three different information structures we prove each one as a separate Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose π ∈ (q l , q h ) and the principal only observes the action the expert takes but not the consequences (j = N C). Then there exists a unique non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In this equilibrium the high-type expert always chooses the policy which matches his signal of the state, p = s. The low-type expert chooses policy p = 1 after observing s = 1 and randomizes with a non-degenerate probability after observing s = 0.
Proof. We begin by noting that in any non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the high-type expert must always choose p = s. This follows immediately from the following argument: in a non-pooling equilibrium both actions must be chosen with positive probability; by monotonicity, if any expert ever chooses a given action, p, then the high-type expert who observed signal p must always choose that action; if the high-type were to randomize after a certain signal, all other experts would have to choose the other action with probability 1; if only the high-type expert were to choose a certain action, the principal would assign reputation λ = 1 after observing that action and all other experts would have an incentive to deviate and choose that action too.
Given that the high-type expert will always choose policy p = s, we can then restrict our analysis to the low-type expert's behavior given that the high-type always follows his signal of the state. We can represent any expert strategy by the double (σ 1 , σ 0 ), the probability of the low-type expert choosing 0 after observing signal s = 1 and s = 0 respectively. Our next task is to show that we must have σ 1 = 0. We do this by contradiction: suppose σ 1 > 0. Then, by monotonicity, we have σ 0 = 1. Now we can calculate the reputations of the expert after proposing each policy for each σ 1 ∈ (0, 1]. Note that by Bayes' rule we can calculate, λ(1|σ 1 , σ 0 = 1) = P r(t = h, p = 1) P r(t = h, p = 1) + P r(t = l, p = 1)
, and λ(0|σ 1 , σ 0 = 1) = P r(t = h, p = 0) P r(t = h, p = 0) + P r(t = l, p = 0)
Note that λ(0|σ 1 , σ 0 = 1) is decreasing in σ 1 and λ(1|σ 1 , σ 0 = 1) is increasing in σ 1 . Further, after simplifying the algebra we can see that,
and
whenever σ 1 > 0. Hence, the expert's reputation would be strictly higher from choosing policy p = 1, which means the above strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium. Hence in any equilibrium we must have σ 1 = 0. Now we must show that there exists a unique equilibrium with σ 1 = 1 and σ 0 ∈ [0, 1]. We can then define λ(p|σ 0 ) to be the reputation of the expert after each policy is chosen, given that σ 0 is the probability a low-type expert chooses p = 0 after observing s = 0. Now, given π, q h , and q l , we can define the reputational difference between choosing policy p = 0 and p = 1 for any probability of randomization σ 0 ,
Notice that we have an equilibrium iff φ(σ 0 ) = 0. Note also that we have already established that
By Bayes' rule we have
Notice then that λ(0|σ 0 ) is clearly decreasing in σ 0 with
Similarly we have that
As the denominator is decreasing in σ 0 , we have that λ(1|σ 0 ) is increasing in σ 0 . In addition,
and we can conclude that φ(σ 0 = 0) > 0. So we can conclude that φ(σ 0 ) is a decreasing function of σ 0 with φ(0) > 0 and φ(1) < 0. So we have established that there exists a unique solution to φ(σ 0 ) = 0, and that σ 0 ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, we conclude there exists a unique non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
This involves the high-type following his signal, and the low-type choosing policy p = 1 after observing signal s = 1 and choosing policy p = 0 with probability σ N C 0 ∈ (0, 1) after observing signal s = 0.
Lemma 2 Suppose π ∈ (q l , q h ) and the principal observes both the action the expert took and the consequences of that action (j = F T ). Then there exists a non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which is unique up to the beliefs at off path information sets. In this equilibrium the high-type expert always chooses the policy which matches his signal of the state (p = s) and the low-type expert chooses policy p = 1 when s = 1 and chooses policy p = 0 with probability σ 0 ∈ [0, 1] when s = 0.
Proof. We begin by noting that in any non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the high-type expert must always choose p = s. To see this, first note that in a non-pooling equilibrium both actions must be chosen with positive probability; by monotonicity, if any expert choose as a given action p, then the high-type expert who observed signal p must choose that action; if the high-type were to randomize after a certain signal, all other experts would have to choose the other action with probability 1. Now there are two cases to consider: q h = 1 and q h < 1. When q h < 1, if only the high-type expert were to choose a certain action, the principal must assign reputation λ = 1 after observing that action, regardless of the consequences, and all other experts would have an incentive to deviate and choose that action too. When q h = 1, then the principal must assign reputation 1 after observing that policy and that p = ω: hence, the high-type expert would strictly prefer to propose policy p = s = ω in that state of the world and it would not be an equilibrium to randomize.
Given that any non-pooling, monotone PBE must involve the high-type always choosing policy p = s, the expert's strategy can then be represented by the double (σ 1 , σ 0 ) as in the Non-Transparent Consequences case. Recall also that monotonicity implies that either σ 1 = 0 or σ 0 = 1. We now show that we must have σ 1 = 0.
the reputations for the expert after each combination (p, ω):
Note that when q h = 1 and σ 1 = 1 then (p, ω) = (1, 0) is off the equilibrium path. As we are
showing that an equilibrium cannot exist because the expert would have an incentive to deviate to action 1, and the action p = 1 is least attractive if the belief after (1, 0) is 0, we can without loss of generality assume that the belief is 0. In the above equations, when q h = 1, λ(1, 0|σ 1 , σ 0 = 1) equals 0 for all σ 1 including as σ 1 is taken to 1.
From the above equations we can note the following properties for any σ 1 > 0:
and λ(0, 0) > λ(0, 1) so being proven correct is beneficial. In addition we have λ(1, 1) > λ(0, 0) and
Finally, as
we can conclude that
Hence, the low-type exert would have a strict incentive to choose policy p = 1 rather than p = 0 after observing s = 1 for the specified strategies. Hence we cannot have a non-pooling, monotone equilibrium with σ 1 > 0.
We now turn to showing that there exists a unique PBE in which the high-type expert always choose policy p = s and the low-type expert's strategy is represented by σ 1 = 0 and σ 0 ∈ [0, 1]. We begin by calculating, via Bayes's rule, the updated reputation for each policy-outcome pair while
Note that when q h = 1 and σ 0 = 0 the information set (p, ω) = (0, 1) is off the equilibrium path.
As the statement of the theorem says nothing about the uniqueness of off-path beliefs, and because λ(0, 1) = 0 is the belief most conducive to supporting an equilibrium with σ 0 = 0, there is no loss of generality is setting the beliefs at that information set equal to 0.
Next we show that, if we can verify that the low-type expert is optimizing after observing s = 0 then it will follow that all other experts are optimizing. To see this, note that, as in the previous case, being proven correct is beneficial: λ(0, 0) > λ(0, 1) and λ(1, 1) > λ(1, 0) for all σ 0 . Hence, if the low-type expert is willing to randomize with probability σ 0 ∈ (0, 1) after observing s = 0, all other experts who observed s = 1 have a strict incentive to choose p = 1 and a high-type expert who observed s = 0 has a strict incentive to choose p = 0. If σ 0 = 1 then the low-type must have a (weak) incentive to choose policy p = 0 after observing s = 0, so the high-type has a strict incentive to choose p = 0 after observing s = 0; we have already established above that experts who observe s = 1 have a strict incentive to choose p = 1. Finally, if σ 0 = 0 then we established in the first paragraph of this proof that the high-type who observed s = 0 must choose policy p = 0; as the low-type who observed s = 0 has a (weak) incentive to choose p = 1 all experts who observe s = 1 must have a strict incentive to choose policy p = 1. Hence, we have shown that, if the low-type expert is optimizing under the specified strategy, all other experts will have a strict incentive to follow the specified strategies for all σ 0 ∈ [0, 1]. So all that remains to show is that there exists a unique σ 0 ∈ [0, 1] such that it is optimal for the low-type expert upon observing s = 0 to chose p = 0 with probability σ 0 and p = 1 with probability 1 − σ 0 .
Notice that λ(1, 1) is increasing, λ(1, 0) is weakly increasing, λ(0, 1) is weakly decreasing and λ(0, 0) is decreasing in σ 0 . So we have that
is decreasing in σ 0 for all q h , q l and π. Hence we can conclude that:
• if ψ(0) ≤ 0 then we have an equilibrium if and only if σ 0 = 0.
• if ψ(0) > 0 and ψ(1) < 0 then there exists a unique σ * ∈ (0, 1) such that we have an equilibrium if and only if σ 0 = σ * .
• if ψ(1) ≥ 0 then we have an equilibrium if and only if σ 0 = 1.
So we can conclude that there exists a PBE with σ 0 ∈ [0, 1] and further that this equilibrium is the unique monotone, non-pooling PBE up to the belief at off-path information sets (if such information sets exist).
Lemma 3 Suppose π ∈ (q l , q h ) and the principal does not observe the action the expert took but does observe the consequences (j = N A). Then there exists a unique non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In this equilibrium the high-type expert always chooses p = s and the low-type expert always chooses p = 1 regardless of his signal of the state.
Proof. We first show that in any non-pooling, monotone PBE we must havē λ(1) >λ(0).
To see this, we begin by noting that both actions p = 0 and p = 1 must be taken with positive probability. Now, by monotonicity, at least one action p ∈ {0, 1} must never be taken when the expert observes signal s = 1 − p . Hence the expert who observes s = p must choose action p with probability σ h if they are the high-type, and σ l if they are the low-type. Note that by monotonicity we must have either σ h = 1 or σ l = 0. Define π = P r(ω = p ) ∈ {π, 1 − π}. Now we can calculatē λ(1) from the equation,λ
(1) = P r(t = h, p = ω) P r(p = ω) .
Note that, as q h > q l and σ h ≥ σ l ,
Therefore, we can conclude thatλ(1) > α. Now, as
we can conclude thatλ(1) >λ(0) in any non-pooling, monotone equilibrium.
Finally, note that the expert will be optimizing, and hence we will have an equilibrium, if and only if, conditional of the expert's private information he always chooses the policy which is most likely to match the state. Now as π ∈ (q l , q h ), we have that,
So we can conclude that in the unique non-pooling, monotone, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the high-type expert will choose policy p = s and the low-type expert will choose policy p = 1 regardless of his signal.
Proof of Proposition 1. This result is immediate combining Lemmas 1-3.
We now turn our attention to Proposition 2, the proof of which we divide into two lemmas.
Lemma 4 When π ≥+α(1−q) ≡ π * in the unique non-pooling, monotone Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the high-type expert follows his signal of the state, the low-type proposes policy p = 1 whenever he observes signal s = 1, and:
1. if the principal observes only the action the expert has taken (j = N C) then the low-type expert who observes s = 0 chooses policy p = 0 with probability σ N C 0 ∈ (0, 1).
2. if the principal observes the consequences of the expert's action, then whether the principal observes the action itself or not, j ∈ {F T, N A}, the low-type expert who observes s = 0 never chooses policy p = 0, so σ Proof of Part 2: There are two separate claims here as it encompasses both the case where the expert's action is observed and when the expert's action is hidden. Recall, however, that by Lemma 3 this claim holds for when only the consequences are observed (j = N A), so we need only prove this result with Full Transparency (j = F T ). Notice that, in order to prove the result, we need only verify that the specified strategies constitute an equilibrium since, by Proposition 1, equilibrium behavior must be unique.
We begin by calculating the reputation λ(p, ω) for any policy-outcome pair given the above expert strategy. Note that the policy-outcome pair (0, 1) will be off-path given the specified expert behavior; to make the equations as easy to satisfy as possible take λ(0, 1) = 0, though there may be other beliefs which support this as an equilibrium. Next we note that, as only the high-type expert ever chooses p = 0, and only the low-type ever chooses p = 1 when the state is 0, the principal must assign beliefs λ(1, 0) = 0, and λ(0, 0) = 1.
Note also that by substituting in q h = 1 and σ 0 = 0 into the equation for λ(1, 1|σ 0 ) we get λ(1, 1) = α.
Finally, recalling that π ≥ π * , the probability that the state is 1 is
Consequently, the expected reputation from choosing p = 1, is at least as high as the expected reputation from choosing p = 0:
So we can conclude that it is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for the low-type expert to choose policy p = 1 after observing signal s = 0.
Lemma 5 There exists a π * < π * , such that for π ∈ (π * , π * ) in the unique non-pooling, monotone
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the high-type expert follows his signal of the state, the low-type chooses policy p = 1 whenever he observes signal s = 1, and:
1. if the principal observes the expert's action, the low-type expert who observes signal s = 0 will choose policy p = 0 with probability σ j 0 ∈ (0, 1) for j ∈ {N C, F T }. Further, 
if the principal does not observe the action the expert took (N
Notice that and that when σ 0 = 1, We write ψ as a function of π to make explicit that the equation which determines the probability of randomization depends on π. Note that ψ depends on π only through P r(ω = 0|t = l, s = 0), and since P r(ω = 0|t = l, s = 0) is continuously decreasing in π, so too is ψ(π, σ 0 ). Further, as ψ is continuously differentiable and decreasing in σ 0 , by the implicit function theorem, we can write the solution to the above equation, σ F T 0 (π), as a continuously differentiable function of π for π ∈ (q, π * ). Now recall the definition of φ(σ 0 ) from equation (2). For each π we can solve for the equilibrium probability that the low-type expert chooses policy p = 0 when only the action is observed (j = N C), σ N C 0 , by setting φ(π, σ 0 ) = λ(0|π, σ 0 ) − λ(1|π, σ 0 ) = 0.
Further, recall that λ(0|π, σ 0 ) = (1 − π)α (1 − π)α + (1 − α)((1 − π)q + π(1 − q))σ 0 , λ(1|π, σ 0 ) = πα 1 − [(1 − π)α + (1 − α)((1 − π)q + π(1 − q))σ 0 ]
We can then see immediately that φ(π, σ 0 ) is a continuous in π and σ 0 and decreasing in σ 0 . In addition, as σ F T 0 (π * ) = 0, φ(π * , σ
Due to the above inequality and the continuity of φ we can then define, π * = inf {π ∈ (q, π * ] : ∀π > π, φ(π , σ
Consequently, for all π ∈ (π * , π * ), φ(π, σ F T 0 (π)) > 0 and so
Proof of Part 2: This follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows immediately from Lemmas 4 and 5.
We now turn our attention to the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposiition 3. Recall that, by Lemma 3, σ N A 0 = 0 for all π > π * ≥ q l for all q h > π.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for all π > π * there exists aq h (q l , π) such that for all q h ∈ (q h (q l , π), 1),
First note that it is immediate that we must have σ F T 0 > 0. If σ F T 0 = 0, then only high-type experts would ever choose policy p = 0 and the principal would then infer that any expert who chose policy p = 0 is the high-type with certainty, regardless of the policy consequences. All experts would then have a strict incentive to choose policy p = 0.
We now establish the second inequality, that σ F T 0 < σ N C 0 when π > π * and q h is sufficiently high. We begin by recalling the definition of the function φ from equation (2) and allow q h to vary while holding π and q l fixed, φ(q h , σ 0 ) = λ(0|q h , σ 0 ) − λ(1|q h , σ 0 ).
Recall also that φ is continuously decreasing in σ 0 for all parameters. Next we note that φ(q h , σ 0 )
is continuously differentiable in both its arguments, q h and σ 0 , and strictly decreasing in q h . To .
So, as π > 1 2 and (1 − α)(1 − ((1 − π)q l + π(1 − q l ))σ 0 ) > 0, we can conclude that, ∂λ(1|q h , σ 0 ) ∂q h > 0.
Hence, we can conclude that ∂φ(q h , σ 0 ) ∂q h < 0.
arguments, by the implicit function theorem, we can implicitly define the continuous function σ N C 0 (q h ) as the solution to φ(q h , σ 0 ) = 0, for each q h . Now, recalling the definition of ψ from equation (3) we can define, for each π and q l , q h (q l , π) = inf {q h ∈ (π, 1] : ∀q h > q h , ψ(q h , σ N C 0 (q h )) < 0}.
Note that as ψ is continuous and
we have thatq h (π, q l ) < 1.
As we have now established that for all q h ∈ (q h , 1),
and given that ψ is decreasing in σ 0 with ψ(q h , σ F T 0 (q h )) = 0, we see that
Hence, we can conclude that for all q h ∈ (q h , 1),
as claimed.
